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1. Introduction
To identify terrorists and money-launderers hiding behind legal entities or arrangements, EU Directive 
2015/849*1 (4AMLD) introduced the ‘UBO register’. In consequence, all Member States (MSs) have to 
establish a central register containing data on ultimate benefi cial owners (UBOs)*2 of corporate legal enti-
ties and also of trusts and legal arrangements similar to trusts (hereinafter ‘SAs’). 
However, before 4AMLD was transposed into the national law of the various MSs, amendments to it – 
referred to by the name ‘5AMLD’ and begun with the European Commission’s ‘Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use 
of the fi nancial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist fi nancing and amending Directive 
2009/101/EC of 5 July 2016’ (referred to below as ‘the Proposal’) – were already on the table*3. The fi nal 
tex t of 5AMLD has not yet been agreed on, but it seems rather likely that it is going to usher in some seri-
ous changes pertaining to trusts and SAs. Inter alia, it probably will list such contractual devices as fi ducie, 
Treuhand, and fi deicomiso as examples of SAs*4. The 4AMLD terms explicitly specifi ed only foundations 
ɲ Directive ɳɱɲɶ/ɹɵɺ of the European Parliament and of the Council of ɳɱ May ɳɱɲɶ on the prevention of the use of the 
fi nancial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist fi nancing, amending Regulation (EU) No ɷɵɹ/ɳɱɲɳ of 
the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive ɳɱɱɶ/ɷɱ/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and Commission Directive ɳɱɱɷ/ɸɱ/EC, ɶ.ɷ.ɳɱɲɶ, L ɲɵɲ/ɸɴ.
ɳ Generally, ‘any natural person who exercises ownership or control over a legal entity’ (Recital ɲɳ); more precise defi nitions 
are given in articles ɴɱ (on corporations) and ɴɲ (on trusts and SAs).
ɴ Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/ɳɱɲɷ/ɱɵɶɱ/
COM_COM(ɳɱɲɷ)ɱɵɶɱ_EN.pdf (most recently accessed on ɳɸ.ɷ.ɳɱɲɸ). Since the release of the proposal, the Council of the 
EU has published several Presidency compromise texts amending and updating it. Additional parliamentary meetings and 
various counterproposals have contributed to the compromise texts. Several committees have reviewed the amendments – e.g., 
the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Economic and Monetary Aﬀ airs and Civil Liberties (EMACL) 
committees. After the vote by the EMACL group, the European Parliament gave the go-ahead, at the March plenary session, 
to start negotiations among said parliament, the Commission, and the Council on the details for the legislation. Voting in 
the European Parliament's plenary session is tentatively scheduled for October ɳɱɲɸ. See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
oeil/popups/fi cheprocedure.do?reference=ɳɱɲɷ/ɱɳɱɹ(COD)&l=en (most recently accessed on ɳɸ.ɵ.ɳɱɲɸ).
ɵ See the Proposal (see Note ɴ)’s p. ɲɷ, proposed Recital ɴɴ (p. ɳɸ), and proposed amendments to Article ɴɲ (p. ɴɴ).
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as legal devices to which the same measures were to be applied as to trusts.*5 Secondly, 5AMLD is going to 
incorporate an attempt to determine in which MS the trusts and SAs should be registered – depending on 
where they are administered*6 rather than which MS’s law has been chosen to govern the trust or SA (the 
latter having been the approach of 4AMLD). This means also that the MSs must be able to recognise trusts 
and SAs established under and governed by the law of other countries (those not being limited to only MSs). 
Thirdly, the circle of persons to whom the data of UBOs will be available will most probably broaden. Accord-
ing to 4AMLD, the information concerning UBOs of trusts and SAs was already to be made directly accessible 
to competent authorities and fi nancial intelligence units (FIUs)*7. The initial proposal for 5AMLD suggested 
allowing public access to the data on those trusts and SAs that are ‘business-type’ and/or administered by 
professionals and granting it to those persons ‘with legitimate interest’ in the case of others.*8 Since then, 
however, there have been proposals to disclose the UBO data of all trusts and SAs to the public.*9 
The MSs are expected to identify SAs used in their countries and to assure the submission of the data of 
related UBOs to a central database.*10 It seems that, at the moment, Estonia has chosen to take the approach 
that, apart from foundations, there are no devices similar to trusts in our legal practice that should be 
subject to UBO-register rules.*11 The aim with this article is to show that there are, in fact, arrangements 
in Estonian private law that have structure or functions similar to those of trusts and hence should be con-
sidered in the listing of SAs. In the paper, I also try to highlight the diﬃ  culties that arise in this regard. The 
article does not cover foundations, as these are instruments clearly addressed in both Estonian legislation and 
the AMLD (‘AMLD’ hereinafter referring to the 4AMLD and 5AMLD together as to the directive in general) 
text, for which reason no confusion as to whether they should be included in UBO registers should arise. For 
similar reasons, it does not cover corporate legal entities. 
For determination of the SAs in Estonian legal practice, the concept of trust should be explained fi rstly. 
The 4AMLD and 5AMLD texts do not give a defi nition of trust. Instead, both equate it with instruments 
used in civil-law systems that have similar structure or functions. Therefore, in addition to providing an 
introduction to trusts, the fi rst section below gives a brief overview of the two SA types mentioned in the 
preparatory documents for the 5AMLD – the Treuhand and fi ducie – and proceeds to highlight the simi-
larities between these and the trust, which should later aid in ascertaining the SAs in Estonian legislation. 
Next, the article turns to the Estonian legal scene and attempts to fi nd arrangements that are similar to 
trusts. Under consideration are family- and succession-law devices (e.g., executorship of a will), various 
forms of shared ownership and communities (in particular, silent partnership and contractual investment 
funds), mandate and commission contracts, intermediated holding of securities, and fi duciary ownership 
for security purposes. 
2. Trusts and SAs under the directive
2.1. Trusts
Purposes. The institution of the trust has developed mainly in jurisdictions based on the English legal 
system. For a long time, it has been viewed as unique to common law since civil-law countries do not have a 
device that is this fl exible and universal for extending across so many legal relationships. 
ɶ E.g., Recital ɲɸ.
ɷ Ibid., p. ɲɹ, proposed Recital ɳɲ (p. ɳɶ), and proposed amendments to Article ɴɲ (pp. ɴɵ–ɴɶ).
ɸ MSs can decide whether access is to be provided also for obliged entities (Art. ɴɲ(ɵ)). The persons with ‘legitimate interest’ 
are not mentioned in the case of trusts and SAs. 
ɹ Ibid., p. ɲɱ, proposed Recital ɴɶ (p. ɳɹ), and proposed amendments to Article ɴɲ (pp. ɴɴ–ɴɵ). 
ɺ E.g., the Opinion of the Committee on Development (ɲ.ɲɳ.ɳɱɲɷ). Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-ɶɺɵ.ɲɲɷ+ɱɳ+DOC+PDF+Vɱ//EN&language=EN (most recently accessed 
on ɳɺ.ɵ.ɳɱɲɸ).
ɲɱ See, for instance, the added para. ɲɱa in the draft European Parliament legislative resolution. Available at http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&mode=XML&reference=Aɹ-ɳɱɲɸ-ɱɱɶɷ&language=EN#_partɲ_defɴ 
(most recently accessed on ɳɺ.ɵ.ɳɱɲɸ). 
ɲɲ See the draft legislation for implementing the ɵAMLD (rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise tõkestamise eelnõu), avail-
able at https://www.riigikogu.ee/tegevus/eelnoud/eelnou/fbɱɴeɳɱe-cafɸ-ɵɷɴd-ɺbɷɱ-ddfɷɱɳɲɸɵɳbɳ/Rahapesu%ɳɱja%ɳɱ
terrorismi%ɳɱrahastamise%ɳɱtõkestamise%ɳɱseadus (most recently accessed on ɳɹ.ɷ.ɳɱɲɸ).
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In common-law countries, trusts are used for a great variety of purposes: protection of (family) assets; 
administration and provision related to vulnerable persons, such as minors, addicts, and the disabled; pres-
ervation of an object or appropriation of property for a specifi c use*12; investment (unit trusts / mutual 
funds)*13; provision for employees upon their retirement (as with pension trusts)*14; charity; management 
of the collateral in cases wherein there is a large number of creditors or when the same security is to benefi t 
successive groups of creditors (syndicate loans, secured-bond issuance)*15; etc. Testamentary trusts are 
 created by a person’s will and arise upon the death of the testator.
While the above-mentioned trusts are express trusts – i.e., knowingly created by a person – there also 
exist trusts that are imposed by law or a court: constructive trusts, statutory trusts, and resulting trusts*16. 
Statutory trusts arise under statutes stipulating that under certain circumstances the property shall be held 
in trust, as in the case of trusts arising in respect of legal estates that are co-owned or with intestacy.*17 Con-
structive trusts are imposed by courts as a remedy, e.g., to prevent unjust enrichment.*18 Resulting trusts 
can be cre ated (in the transferor’s favour) in cases wherein property is gratuitously transferred and there is 
insuﬃ  cient evidence to ascertain the transferor’s intention – i.e. that the transferor meant to make a gift or 
loan and abandon his benefi cial interest.*19
Defi nition and parties. The Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)*20 defi nes the trust as a legal 
r elationship in which a trustee is obliged to administer or dispose of one or more assets (the trust fund) in 
accordance with the terms governing the relationship (trust terms) to benefi t a benefi ciary or advance pub-
lic benefi t purposes. The person who constitutes the trust and defi nes the trust terms is called the settlor*21. 
The roles of the parties may overlap.*22 A trust is not a legal entity or a contract*23. 
Fiduciary ownership. An esse ntial feature of a trust is that the title*24 to the trust fund is vested in 
the trustee: ‘For the purposes of performing the trust the trustee is cloaked in the mantle of an outright 
owner.’*25 But the interpretation of ‘title’ is not always synonymous with ‘ownership’. In most trust jurisdic-
tions, the trustee actually becomes the owner of the trust fund*26. But some civil-law jurisdictions th at have 
ɲɳ Non-charitable-purpose trusts with no benefi ciaries are not allowed in English law (see, for example, M. Lupoi. Trusts: A 
Comparative Study. Cambridge University Press ɳɱɱɱ, p. ɲɳɴ) but are possible in other jurisdictions.
ɲɴ D. Hayton et al. Underhill and Hayton Law of Trusts and Trustees. ɲɹth ed. LexisNexis ɳɱɲɱ, p. ɷɸ.
ɲɵ Ibid., p. ɷɺ.
ɲɶ Ibid., p. ɷɱ.
ɲɷ Ibid., p. ɵɳɱ.
ɲɸ Ibid., p. ɵɳɱ.
ɲɹ Ibid., p. ɹɴ.
ɲɺ Ibid., p. ɹɲ.
ɳɱ C. von Bar et al. (eds). Principles, Defi nitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference. 
Outline edition, ɳɱɱɺ. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/fi les/european-private-law_en.pdf (most recently 
accessed on ɳɺ.ɵ.ɳɱɲɸ). The trust of Book X of the DCFR is the latest example of international trust models – it takes the 
civil-law approach to an English trust and, accordingly, should be comprehensible also for lawyers of a civil-law jurisdiction. 
As it is the only trust model that has been agreed upon (to some extent) among the MSs and that could possibly serve as a 
model for domestic or European trust legislation in the future, the author of this article has chosen the provisions of Book 
X for giving an overview of the defi nition and main components of the trust. 
ɳɲ In the DCFR, the term ‘truster’ is used.
ɳɳ However, under the DCFR, a person cannot be a sole trustee for solely that person’s benefi t (X.-ɺ:ɲɱɺ).
ɳɴ The constitution of a trust requires the unilateral declaration of the settlor. If it is not a self-declaration trust, wherein the 
settlor is also the sole trustee, the transfer of the assets from the settlor to the trustee is the second prerequisite. See p. ɶɷɹɱ 
in C. von Bar, E. Clive (eds). Principles, Defi nitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (DCFR), Volume ɷ. Oxford University Press ɳɱɲɱ. 
ɳɵ Nevertheless, it might be that the trustee further invests the trust assets. In that case, ‘a custodian, on behalf of a trustee (and 
on trust for the trustee qua trustee), has title to what laymen consider to be the trust assets although, strictly speaking, it is 
the trustee who has title to his rights against the custodian, such rights actually being the trust assets,’ states D. Hayton. The 
trust in European commercial life. – J. Lowry, L. Mistelis (eds). Commercial Law: Perspectives and Practice. LexisNexis 
Butterworths ɳɱɱɷ.
ɳɶ C. von Bar, E. Clive (see Note ɳɴ), p. ɶɷɺɲ.
ɳɷ In legal literature, the trust-specifi c situation in common law countries, where the title of an asset is held by a person who 
administers it for the benefi t of another, has often been illustrated through the ‘split ownership’ concept, in which the legal 
title belongs to the trustee and the benefi ciary has the benefi cial/equitable title. Nowadays, legal scholars writing on trusts 
are more of the opinion that the abovementioned ‘title-split’ does not exist, that it has been used to clarify the trust concept 
to civil law lawyers and that the trustee is really the full owner. See, e.g., P. Matthews. The compatibility of trust with the civil 
law notion of property. – L. Smith (ed.). The Worlds of the Trust, p. ɴɲɷ. Cambridge University Press ɳɱɲɴ. – DOI: https://
doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɲɸ/CBOɺɸɹɲɲɴɺɶɱɶɺɺɵ.ɱɲɶ.
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applied the trust use diﬀ erent solutions: in China, Louisiana, and Quebec, ‘title’ to trust property is in the 
name of the trustee whilst ownership of the trust property is said to lie with the settlor, benefi ciary, or none 
of the trust parties, respectively.*27 
Even if the trustee is the owner, it must be remembered that the trust assets have only been passed to 
him for the purposes set forth in the trust terms. Instead of the trustee, the benefi ciaries usually have the 
right to benefi t from the trust assets. 
The settlor or benefi ciaries should not have the right to order the trustee around – the retaining of pow-
ers by the settlor must not extend past the limit beyond which the trust can be deemed void or ‘sham’*28. 
However, some jurisdictions (mainly oﬀ shore) do allow trusts that would be considered ‘sham’ in others.
Segregation of patrimonies. With the trustee being the owner of the trust fund, he can be person-
ally liable to satisfy trust debts (the fi rst rule regarding creditors still is that they may satisfy their rights out 
of the trust fund)*29, but his personal creditors shall not have recourse to the fund, as the trust fund is to 
be regarded as a patrimony distinct from the personal patrimony of the trustee and any other patrimonies 
vested in or managed by the trustee.*30 The trust fund is also immune from claims by the trustee’s heirs and 
spouse.*31 Neither shall the trust fund be available for creditors of the settlor or benefi ciary (although they 
may appeal to the benefi ciary’s rights related to the trust fund*32), nor are the benefi ciary and the settlor in 
that capacity liable to a trust creditor.*33 
Tracing. Another specifi c feature of the common-law trust is the special nature of the rights of 
 benefi ciaries against third persons in the event of misappropriation of the trust assets by the trustee. 
Although benefi ciaries are not the owners of trust assets, they might have a claim against a third-party 
recipient who is not an acquirer for value in good faith.*34 
2.2. The similarity in SAs 
The Treuhand. In Germany*35, the Treuhand is a contractual relationship wherein a person (the Treu-
händer) is entrusted with certain property (the Treugut), which he has to administer or dispose of, not in 
his own interest but in the interest of another person (the Treugeber) or for a specifi c purpose.
This institution is not explicitly regulated by law and is instead governed by academic writings and case 
law. Usually, the provisions regulating a mandate or contract for the management of aﬀ airs of another are 
applied also.*36 
A distinction is made between the security T reuhand and the administrative Treuhand: the former 
protects the interests of the Treuhänder by providing him with security through the transfer of assets; in the 
case of the latter, the Treuhänder manages the assets in the interests of the Treugeber.*37 
The Treuhänder becomes the owner of the assets transferred to him and, as an owner, may dispose 
of them. The contract creating the Treuhand can set certain limits for that, but these have only obliga-
tory eﬀ ect. Hence, dispositions made in breach of such obligations are generally valid.*38 In the event of 
 misappropriation of property by the Treuhänder, the benefi ciary could have an in personam claim against 
the third-party transferee if the Treuhänder himself is insolvent and also the transferee has conspired with 
the Treuhänder to damage the Treugeber or the benefi ciary.*39 
ɳɸ D. Clarry. Fiduciary ownership and trusts in a comparative perspective. – International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
ɷɴ (ɳɱɲɵ) / ɵ (Oct.), pp. ɺɱɲ–ɺɴɴ, on p. ɺɳɷ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɲɸ/Sɱɱɳɱɶɹɺɴɲɵɱɱɱɵɷɴ.
ɳɹ See, for example, D. Hayton et al. (see Note ɲɴ), pp. ɹɹ–ɺɸ.
ɳɺ X.-ɲɱ:ɲɱɲ(ɲ), X.-ɲɱ:ɳɱɲ(ɲ), and X.-ɲɱ:ɳɱɳ of the DCFR.
ɴɱ X.-ɲ:ɳɱɳ(ɲ)(ɳ)(a) of the DCFR.
ɴɲ X.-ɲ:ɳɱɳ(ɳ)(b)(c) of the DCFR.
ɴɳ X.-ɲɱ:ɲɱɲ(ɲ) of the DCFR.
ɴɴ X.-ɲɱ:ɳɱɴ of the DCFR.
ɴɵ See M. Lupoi (Note ɲɳ), pp. ɶɹ–ɷɶ. 
ɴɶ The Treuhand is used also in Austria, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein. 
ɴɷ S. van Erp, B. Akkermans (eds). Cases, Materials and Text on Property Law. Hart Publishing ɳɱɲɳ, p. ɶɷɶ.
ɴɸ D. Krimphove. National report for Germany. – S.C.J.J. Kortmann et al. (eds). Towards an EU Directive on Protected Funds, 
pp. ɲɲɶ–ɲɵɴ. Kluwer Legal Publishers ɳɱɱɺ, p. ɲɲɸ. 
ɴɹ S. van Erp, B. Akkermans (Note ɴɷ), p. ɶɹɴ.
ɴɺ Ibid., p. ɷɲɴ.
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The Treugeber never quite drops out of the picture: the Treuhänder has an obligation to report to the 
Treugeber, and it is possible for the Treugeber to be allowed to revoke the Treuhand. While the Treu-
händer is the owner, the Treugut is still ‘economically’ deemed to belong to the Treugeber. Therefore, 
in cases of insolvency of the Treugeber, the creditors of the Treugeber can reclaim the Treugut from the 
Treuhänder (but this is only a personal claim).*40 On the other hand, when the Treuhänder is insolvent, 
the Treugeber or third-party benefi ciary can oppose attacks from personal creditors of the Treuhänder and 
demand release of assets belonging to the Treugut (but only if those assets have been provided to the Treu-
gut directly from the Treugeber).*41 
The fi ducie. Article 2011 of the French Civil Code*42 defi nes the fi ducie as a transaction with which the 
constituant*43 transfers things, rights, or securities to the fi duciarie, who, keeping them segregated from his 
own patrimony, acts so as to further a particular purpose for the benefi t of benefi ciaries.
French law explicitly states that the fi duciary patrimony is subject to execution only for debts arising 
from the keeping or management of this patrimony*44 and is thereby protected from the creditors of the 
fi duciarie*45 as well as of the constituant. Unlike under the law of England or Germany, only specifi c insti-
tutions or professions can function as a fi duciarie: individuals, apart from avocats, are excluded.*46 It is 
used mainly as a security device (fi ducie-sureté)*47, wherein the fi duciarie is the benefi ciary also, and for 
management purposes for the benefi t of the constituant himself (fi ducie-gestion). A fi ducie cannot be set 
up for a third-party benefi ciary (unless that benefi ciary confers upon the constituant a benefi t somehow 
equivalent to the value of the things he receives)*48. In France, a fi ducie has to be registered.*49
The common feature. While in common law a trust is not a legal entity or a contract, the similar 
instruments mentioned in 5AMLD are of contractual nature, as with the Treuhand and fi ducie, or are legal 
entities, such as foundations. Also, while with a trust the assets constituting the trust fund are ring-fenced, 
such that protection is included in the event of insolvency of the settlor, the Treuhand ends in consequence 
of insolvency of the Treugeber and the assets may then be reclaimed from the Treuhänder, so we can say 
that the segregation of property is not an obligatory feature for an arrangement to be treated as similar 
to trusts under the AMLD. The benefi ciaries’ rights against third persons in cases of misappropriation of 
 property by the trustee are generally stronger in the case of trusts.*50 
This leaves us with one common characteristic: the property is entrusted to one person, who holds the 
title to it, for the benefi t of one or more other persons or for a specifi c purpose. Hence, from the outside the 
property has one person as an owner, but there exists an internal relationship also – potentially invisible to 
the public – which obliges the trustee to observe certain duties and which may enable another person to gain 
the economic benefi t from the trust property. Below, the further examination of the possible SAs in Estonia 
proceeds from this conclusion. 
3. Possible SAs in Estonia
3.1. Succession- and family-law devices
Although there are legal structures that are functionally similar to trusts in that they cater for the same sorts 
of needs as are dealt with by the trust in common-law countries, in the AMLD context we can presumably 
exclude those with no ‘hidden’ benefi cial owner. 
ɵɱ Ibid., p. ɷɲɵ.
ɵɲ Ibid.
ɵɳ Code Civil, law no ɳɱɱɸ-ɳɲɲ of ɲɺ February ɳɱɱɸ.
ɵɴ A legal or a natural person.
ɵɵ Article ɳɱɳɶ(ɲ) of the Code Civil.
ɵɶ Article ɳɱɳɵ of the Code Civil.
ɵɷ S. van Erp, B. Akkermans (Note ɴɷ), p. ɶɸɸ.
ɵɸ See, for example, F. Barrière. The security fi ducie in French law. – L. Smith (ed.). The Worlds of the Trust, pp. ɲɱɲ–ɲɵɱ. 
Cambridge University Press ɳɱɲɴ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɲɸ/CBOɺɸɹɲɲɴɺɶɱɶɺɺɵ.ɱɱɹ.
ɵɹ S. van Erp, B. Akkermans (Note ɴɷ), pp. ɶɸɷ–ɶɸɶ.
ɵɺ Articles ɳɱɲɱ and ɳɱɲɺ of the Code Civil.
ɶɱ S. van Erp, B. Akkermans (Note ɴɷ), p. ɷɲɴ.
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So, although a testator can appoint an executor of will*51 or a court can appoint an administrator 
for the estate of the deceased*52, who might have the right to possess, use, or dispose of the property 
(while the successor does not have the right to dispose of it), the successor – and not the executor or admin-
istrator – will be recorded as the owner of the property in the respective registers. Hence, the situation is 
not trust-like for AMLD purposes, even though the oﬃ  ces of executor and administrator carry out the same 
functions as those of the testamentary trustee in England. 
The same applies to guardianship of vulnerable persons – although the guardian might have obliga-
tions similar to the trustee’s, the person under guardianship is still regarded as the owner, although he does 
not have the right to enter into transactions himself*53. Also, in this context, there is probably no need for 
a lengthy analysis of the institute of representation*54, wherein one person can conduct transactions for 
another but does so not in his own name or on his own behalf but for the principal (although, again, some 
of his duties might be similar to duties of a trustee).
Also, the Law of Succession Act (LSA) provides for the possibility of naming a subsequent succes-
sor: in the case of arrival of a particular date or fulfi lment of a set condition, the estate or a share thereof 
transfers from a provisional successor to a subsequent successor (see the LSA’s §45(1)). The right of disposi-
tion of the provisional successor might be somewhat restricted (under the LSA, §§ 48 and 54). This arrange-
ment may resemble an interest-in-possession trust*55, but until the relevant date or condition has come to 
pass (and the subsequent successor is to be transferred ownership), the subsequent successor, in that capac-
ity, will have no ‘hidden’ benefi cial rights with regard to the estate and the provisional successor is the full 
owner. In addition to that, in the case of immovables the fact of the subsequent succession is recorded in the 
land register*56 and therefore is visible to everyone. Needless to say, the situation of subsequent succession 
can only arise in the case of someone’s death, which makes it an ineﬀ ective means for money laundering. 
3.2. Shared ownership and communities
As was mentioned earlier in the paper, in common-law countries trusts also can be established in cases 
wherein, for example, land is owned by more than one person.*57 In Estonia, when a right or a thing belongs 
to several persons at the same time, this is usually manifested by the entry in the relevant register*58 – if 
the object of shared ownership*59 or community (ühisus*60) has to be registered – or, in the case of mov-
ables, by the joint possession*61. Hence, in cases of co-owners*62, spouses*63, co-successors*64, and an 
‘ordinary’ partnership (seltsing)*65, there is no ‘hiding’ the owner and the situation cannot be deemed 
trust-like in that sense. 
ɶɲ Under the terms of sections ɸɹ–ɹɸ of the Law of Succession Act (pärimisseadus). – RT I ɳɱɱɹ, ɸ, ɶɳ; ɲɱ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ, ɲɷ. English 
text available at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ɶɳɹɱɴɳɱɲɷɱɱɲ/consolide (most recently accessed on ɳɺ.ɵ.ɳɱɲɸ).
ɶɳ See Section ɲɲɳ of the LSA.
ɶɴ See Sections ɹ-ɲɳ of the General Part of the Civil Code Act, or tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus (GPCCA). – RT I ɳɱɱɳ, ɴɶ, 
ɳɲɷ; ɲɳ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɶ, ɲɱɷ. English text available at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ɶɳɹɱɹɳɱɲɶɱɱɵ/consolide (most recently 
accessed on ɳɺ.ɵ.ɳɱɲɸ).
ɶɵ See Sections ɲɲɶ-ɲɴɲ of the GPCCA.
ɶɶ In the case of an interest-in-possession trust, one benefi ciary is granted a right to the income from the trust or the right to 
use it, by the settlor. Upon the death of said (fi rst) benefi ciary, the rest of the fund may pass to another benefi ciary.
ɶɷ See §ɵɺɲ of the Land Register Act, or kinnistusraamatuseadus (LRA). – RT I ɲɺɺɴ, ɷɶ, ɺɳɳ; ɳɹ.ɷ.ɳɱɲɷ, ɹ. English text avail-
able at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ɶɲɶɲɳɳɱɲɷɱɱɳ/consolide (most recently accessed on ɳɺ.ɵ.ɳɱɲɸ).
ɶɸ M. Lupoi (Note ɲɳ), p. ɲɺ.
ɶɹ See the LRA, §ɲɵ(ɳ). Also, §ɸɱ of the Law of Property Act, or asjaõigusseadus (LPA). – RT I ɲɺɺɴ, ɴɺ, ɶɺɱ; ɳɶ.ɲ.ɳɱɲɸ, ɵ. English 
text available at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ɶɳɷɱɲɳɱɲɸɱɱɳ/consolide (most recently accessed on ɳɺ.ɵ.ɳɱɲɸ). 
ɶɺ See the LPA, §ɸɱ(ɲ).
ɷɱ If a right belongs to several persons. See the LPA’s §ɸɱ(ɸ).
ɷɲ See the LPA’s §ɴɳﬀ .
ɷɳ Under §ɸɱ(ɴ) of the LPA.
ɷɴ Under §ɳɶ of the Family Law Act (perekonnaseadus). – RT I ɳɱɱɺ, ɷɱ, ɴɺɶ; ɳɲ.ɲɳ.ɳɱɲɷ, ɲɳ. English text available at https://
www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ɶɳɸɲɳɳɱɲɷɱɱɵ/consolide (most recently accessed on ɳɺ.ɵ.ɳɱɲɸ).
ɷɵ See §ɲɵɸ of the LSA.
ɷɶ See §§ ɶɺɷ-ɷɱɺ of the Law of Obligations Act, or võlaõigusseadus (LOA). – RT I ɳɱɱɲ, ɹɲ, ɵɹɸ; ɴɲ.ɲɳ.ɳɱɲɷ, ɸ. English text 
available at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ɶɳɵɱɲɳɱɲɸɱɱɳ/consolide (most recently accessed on ɳɺ.ɵ.ɳɱɲɸ).
Katrin Sepp
Legal Arrangements Similar to Trusts in Estonia under the EU’s Anti-money-laundering Directive
62 JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 26/2017
There are two exceptions, though: the silent partnership and contractual investment funds.
While in cases involving an ‘ordinary’ partnership, the parties to the partnership are visible from the 
outside, then in the case of silent partnership (§§ 610–618 of the Law of Obligations Act, modelled after 
the German Stille Gesellschaft) only one of the parties (the ‘proprietor’) is visible to third persons, while 
there exists an internal relationship that oﬀ ers privacy to the other party to the contract – the silent partner. 
The silent partner makes a contribution (cash, services, or other assets) to the business of the proprietor and 
in return is entitled to share in the profi ts arising from the business. The contribution normally becomes 
the property of the proprietor. With respect to third parties, the proprietor is the owner of the commercial 
enterprise and carries on business in his own name. For certain operations, the proprietor should obtain 
the consent of the silent partner, but not having that consent does not aﬀ ect the validity of the transactions 
concluded (the silent partner will have a personal claim against the proprietor).*66 The silent partner is 
generally not liable for third-party claims arising from the business*67. Nevertheless, if agreement is not 
made otherwise, he has to participate in the losses of the business*68. Under the partnership agreement, 
the silent partner might have the right to participate in the decision-making.*69 The partnership comes to 
an end when either of the parties goes bankrupt.*70 The assets contributed to the enterprise by the silent 
partner are not ring-fenced: when the proprietor (either natural or legal person) has several enterprises to 
his name or there are personal creditors there is no segregation, and the silent partner (or the contribution) 
has no specifi c protection.
Although the silent partnership would not qualify as a trust in the ‘classical’ sense, it seems that it fi ts 
the SA category for AMLD purposes. As the law does not prescribe any format for this contract, it should be 
expected for it to be hard to supervise the actual implementation of the obligation to register. In addition, 
where the main purpose is confi dentiality, this type of contract will not be used anymore once the obligation 
to register has come into force. 
In the case of contractual investment funds (common funds), the money collected through the issue 
of units and other assets acquired via the investment of said money are owned jointly by the unit-holders, 
and the management company (‘manco’) shall conclude transactions with the assets of the fund for the 
account of all the unit-holders collectively but in its own name (see §4(1) of the Investment Funds Act 
(IFA)*71). This means that the manco will be recorded in the registries as having title to the property of the 
fund.*72 
Common funds also provide trust-style segregation of patrimonies: claims of creditors of the manco 
cannot be satisfi ed out of such assets.*73 The funds are immune also from claims by creditors of unit-hold-
ers*74.
Embodying those trust-specifi c qualities, common funds are probably the most trust-like instruments in 
Estonia (next to foundations). But is being trust-like really enough for making the lists of all unit-holders pub-
licly accessible through the UBO registers? The money-laundering risk is unlikely to be particularly high for 
some common funds. This is especially true for those subject to extensive regulation and Financial Supervi-
sion Authority oversight. It is worth mentioning too that all pension funds – including mandatory pension 
funds, in the case of which the sum accrues as a percentage of lawful income – are established as common 
funds in Estonia. 
Also, in the case of trusts and SAs, the AMLD draws no distinction with regard to whether the benefi cial 
owners have any actual decision-making rights (in the case of many common funds in Estonia, the unit-holders 
do not). However, if an investment fund were established as a corporation instead of using the contractual com-
mon fund format (in Estonia, these can be established as, for example, a public limited company or a limited 
ɷɷ P. Varul et al. Võlaõigusseadus II. Kommenteeritud väljaanne [‘Law of Obligations II, Commented Edition’]. Tallinn ɳɱɱɸ, 
p. ɸɲɴ.
ɷɸ Ibid.; LOA, §ɷɲɱ(ɴ).
ɷɹ LOA, §§ ɷɲɵ(ɲ) and ɷɲɹ(ɳ).
ɷɺ P. Varul et al. (see Note ɷɷ), p. ɸɲɸ.
ɸɱ LOA, §§ ɶɺɷ(ɲ)ɸ) and ɷɲɹ(ɲ).
ɸɲ Investeerimisfondide seadus. – RT I, ɴɲ.ɲɳ.ɳɱɲɷ, ɴ (in Estonian).
ɸɳ In the case of immovables, a notation needs to be made in the land register, indicating the fund on whose behalf the immov-
able is acquired. See §ɳɴ(ɲ)(ɵ) of the IFA. The assets may, alternatively, be registered in the name of the depositary, if there 
is corresponding consent of the manco; see §ɳɺɷ(ɳ). 
ɸɴ IFA, §ɳɷ(ɵ)(ɷ).
ɸɵ IFA, §ɲɴ(ɵ).
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partnership), there would be a threshold for the registration of UBOs. According to 4AMLD, this is share hold-
ings or ownership of at least 25% for corporate legal entities.*75 Accordingly, many of the investment vehicles 
established as corporations could escape the UBO-registration requirement while common funds could not.
3.3. Commission and undisclosed mandate
By contract of commission, the agent undertakes to enter into a transaction in his own name yet on account 
of the principal – e.g., to buy or sell an object for the principal*76. This arrangement is a subspecies of 
authorisation agreement. Via an authorisation agreement (hereinafter also ‘the mandate’), the mandatary 
undertakes to provide services to the mandator pursuant to the agreement*77. These services may include 
negotiating and entering into contracts with third parties. 
The Law of Obligations Act (§626(3)) provides that the claims and movables acquired by the agent/ 
mandatary shall not be subject to a claim by the mandatary’s/agent’s creditors. But this segregation of pat-
rimonies does not apply to immovables or rights other than claims.*78 There is no suﬃ  cient Treuhand-like 
case law or doctrine in Estonia. In principle, the Supreme Court has recognised the possibility of fi duciary 
ownership also in the case of immovables*79: it is possible to construct trust-like devices whereby the owner ship 
is transferred to an acquirer whose rights as an owner are restricted in the contract – he might be obliged to 
exercise the owner’s rights for the benefi t of the transferor by, for example, letting him use the asset. However, 
there will be no protection of the benefi ciary’s rights in the event of the trustee’s insolvency or misappropria-
tion of the property – unless, of course, the benefi ciary’s right is somehow made visible in the land register. 
For instance, if the parties have agreed that the benefi ciary has a future right to acquire an immovable, it 
would be possible to enter in the land register a notation on this, which would serve the principle of publicity 
and guarantee that any disposal of said immovable after the entry of the notation in the register shall be void 
if it violates the rights of the benefi ciary*80. Having such a notation in the public registry would presumably 
remove the ‘trust-like’ component in AMLD context, however, and thereby release contracts of this kind from 
the UBO-registry burden. On the other hand, in the absence of such a notation, the practical implementation 
of this construction seems quite risky and hence would be expected to be infrequently applied.
3.4. Intermediated holding of securities
Commission and mandate contracts are often used in trading on stock exchanges and in other regulated 
markets. For the intermediated holding of securities, the specifi c provisions of the Securities Market Act 
(SMA)*81 and Estonian Central Register of Securities Act (ECRSA)*82 apply in addition to the Law of Obliga-
tions Act. 
Intermediated holding of securities that are registered in the Estonian Central Register of Securities 
(ECRS), such as shares of public limited companies except investment funds, can be accomplished through 
a nominee account (ECRSA, §6). When exercising the rights and performing the obligations arising from 
the securities, the holder of the nominee account has to follow the instructions of the client. Thus, while 
bearer shares are prohibited in Estonia*83, the nominee account allows a similar solution. However, the list 
ɸɶ Compare Article ɴ(ɷ)(b), Article ɴɲ(ɲ), Article ɴ(ɷ)(a), and Article ɴɱ of ɵAMLD.
ɸɷ LOA, §ɷɺɳ(ɲ).
ɸɸ LOA, §ɷɲɺ. 
ɸɹ P. Varul et al. Võlaõigusseadus III. Kommenteeritud väljaanne [‘Law of Obligations III, Commented Edition’]. Tallinn ɳɱɱɺ, 
p. ɳɳ. 
ɸɺ CCSCd ɳɴ.ɺ.ɳɱɱɶ, ɴ-ɳ-ɲ-ɹɱ-ɱɶ, paragraph ɳɳ. – RT III ɳɱɱɶ, ɳɺ, ɴɱɱ (in Estonian).
ɹɱ LPA, §ɷɴ(ɴ)(ɶ).
ɹɲ Väärtpaberituru seadus. – RT I ɳɱɱɲ, ɹɺ, ɶɴɳ; ɸ.ɵ.ɳɱɲɸ, ɵ. English text available at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/
eli/ɶɲɺɱɵɳɱɲɸɱɱɲ/consolide (most recently accessed on ɳɺ.ɵ.ɳɱɲɸ).
ɹɳ Eesti väärtpaberite keskregistri seadus. – RT I ɳɱɱɱ, ɶɸ, ɴɸɴ; ɴɲ.ɲɳ.ɳɱɲɷ, ɳɶ. English text available at https://www.riigi-
teataja.ee/en/eli/ɶɲɹɱɲɳɱɲɸɱɱɵ/consolide (most recently accessed on ɳɺ.ɵ.ɳɱɲɸ).
ɹɴ All shares have to be registered, and the rights attached to a registered share shall belong to the person who is entered as 
the shareholder in the share register – see §ɳɳɹ of the Commercial Code (Äriseadustik). – RT I ɲɺɺɶ, ɳɷ, ɴɶɶ; ɲɴ.ɸ.ɳɱɲɷ. 
Bearer shares were allowed until ɳɱɱɲ.
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of possible holders of nominee accounts is limited.*84 Also, a notation shall be made in the register indicat-
ing that the account is a nominee account (the identity of the client will not be disclosed). 
With regard to the creditors of the holder of a nominee account, the securities are deemed to be those 
of the client and not the holder of the nominee account (see §6(4)(6) of the ECRSA). The same applies for 
other securities held in custody for clients (under §88(6) of the SMA). 
3.5. SAs for security purposes
In addition to the purposes of management or mere holding of assets, fi duciary ownership for secu-
rity purposes – assignment of rights or transfer of ownership of things in order to provide collateral – is 
used.*85 Again, there are no express provisions regulating these relationships (the only exception being 
fi nancial collateral*86), and they are not recognisable as such to third parties. 
Using a security agent for purposes of securing bond issuance and syndicate loans can feature a mix 
of the mandate and the assignment of rights or transfer of ownership of things to the security agent. To 
third persons, the security agent is the holder of a restricted real right (pledge or mortgage) or an object that 
has been transferred to him, but he has to exercise the associated rights in the interests of the investors/
lenders.*87 
Again, those arrangements used for security purposes are defi nitely trust- or Treuhand/fi ducie-like, but 
are they really dangerous money-laundering-wise and in need of being registered?*88 
4. Conclusions
Section 2 showed that the SAs mentioned in the preparatory texts for the 5AMLD – the Treuhand and the 
fi ducie – do not share all the elements of a common-law trust. Accordingly, the conclusion was stated that 
in the AMLD context being ‘trust-like’ rather boils down to situations wherein from the outside the prop-
erty has one person as an owner but there also exists an internal relationship that obliges the title-holder 
to observe certain duties and that may enable another person with the economic benefi t from the property.
Section 3 showed that there indeed are arrangements in the Estonian legal system that fall into this 
category of SAs under the AMLD. Moreover, there are arrangements that embody more than one char-
acteristic of the trust. This is, of course, not unexpected. Even though there is no single institution under 
Estonian law that could perform all the functions of a common-law trust, the same legal relationships exist. 
That said, just as not all trusts contain comfortably hidden and untaxed piles of valuable property, not all 
SAs of civil-law countries are ill-intentioned – many may well, for example, only hold an item with a very 
small value for a very short time as an object. It is hard to believe that the drafters of the AMLD really meant 
that all instruments that resemble a trust should be entered in UBO registries, but the defi nition related to 
being ‘similar to trusts’ is pretty vague. If one really wants, some similarity with trusts can be seen in many 
other structures wherein the right to benefi t from an asset is not clearly manifested, but it would be an 
ɹɵ Presumably, they are obliged entities with the obligation to identify their clients and perform other, respective tasks. See 
§ɷ(ɲ) of the ECRSA.
ɹɶ P. Varul et al. Asjaõigusseadus II. Kommenteeritud vln. [‘Property Law II, Commented Ed.’]. Juura ɳɱɲɵ, p. ɵɴɵ; K. Toom-
mägi. Vallasasjade tagatisomandamine – selle olemus ja realiseerimine [‘Security ownership transfers of movable assets – 
essence and enforcement’]. MA thesis. Tallinn ɳɱɲɵ. Available at http://dspace.ut.ee/bitstream/handle/ɲɱɱɷɳ/ɵɴɱɲɶ/
toommagi_ma_ɳɱɲɵ.pdf?sequence=ɲ&isAllowed=y (most recently accessed on ɳɺ.ɵ.ɳɱɲɸ). 
ɹɷ Financial collateral is the transfer of a right of claim to money in an account, securities, or a credit claim in order to provide 
collateral when both the collateral-provider and the collateral-taker are professional securities-market participants or when 
at least one party is in the latter class and the other one is a large corporation. See the LPA’s §ɴɲɵɲ ﬀ . 
ɹɸ See E. Pisuke. Võlakirjaemissiooni tagatisagent [‘The role of the security agent in the issuance of bonds’]. MA thesis, ɳɱɲɴ. Avail-
able at http://dspace.ut.ee/bitstream/handle/ɲɱɱɷɳ/ɴɳɲɹɸ/pisuke_erki.pdf (most recently accessed on ɳɺ.ɵ.ɳɱɲɸ); 
A. Kotsjuba. Tagatisagendiga kaasnevate riskide maandamine Eesti õiguses [‘Mitigation of legal risks related to security 
agents under Estonian law’]. MA thesis. Tallinn ɳɱɲɴ. Available at https://dspace.ut.ee/bitstream/handle/ɲɱɱɷɳ/ɴɱɹɵɺ/
kotsjuba_andreas.pdf?sequence=ɲ&isAllowed=y (most recently accessed on ɳɺ.ɵ.ɳɱɲɸ).
ɹɹ Firstly, on account of the nature of these relationships. Secondly, the benefi ciaries might be quite easily identifi able in some 
cases, with one example being bondholders, who are registered in the ECRS in the case of securing bond issuance with the 
aid of a security agent. Then again, UBO registration in a special database is required also in cases involving corporations, 
whose owners are likewise identifi able via registers in Estonia.
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incredible burden to start registering them all and later supervise the fulfi lment of the obligation of registra-
tion. Even the registration of just the SAs considered in Section 3 would cause a disproportionate adminis-
trative hassle, costs, and loss of privacy for decent citizens, while the actual money-launderers would in the 
future refrain from concluding contracts deemed trust-like and fi nd other means (e.g., using ‘straw men’). 
Therefore, I would say that the AMLD rules require clarifi cation based on more careful study of the concept 
of trust or of arrangements that are used by money-launderers. Otherwise, we will see another example 
of ‘costly failure’ and ‘ill-guided activism responding to the need “to be seen to be doing something’” that 
 anti-money-laundering policies have been accused of*89.
As was mentioned in the introduction, Estonia seems to have chosen to take the stance that (apart from 
foundations) there are no SAs in our legal practice that are subject to UBO-register rules. I would dare to 
recommend an approach that is between the two extremes: to analyse the SAs by evaluating the risk of 
money laundering on the basis of aspects such as the parties involved, the arrangement’s object, its value 
and the duration of the agreement, the costs of registering the UBOs, the proportionality of the infringement 
of the right to privacy of decent citizens, etc. and to work out the criteria for registration of SAs accordingly. 
ɹɺ S.K. Singh. Bank Regulations. Discovery Publishing House ɳɱɱɺ, p. ɵɵ. 
